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Lucian Blaga on the Nature of God 
Michael S. Jones, 1 March, 2010 
 
Introduction 
In 2008 I published an article with the title, Lucian Blaga on the Existence of God. The question 
of the existence of God is undoubtedly one of the most frequently posed and hotly debated in the 
history of philosophy. It is a question of perennial interest, and rightly so, for if there is a God, 
that fact can serve as a heuristic that facilitates the resolution of many other questions, but also 
gives rise to interesting questions such as those addressed by theodicy, questions related to 
religious pluralism, and the questions of philosophical theology relating to the nature of God. 
Conversely, if there is no God, this fact gives rise to questions about the origin of the universe, 
rationality, and morality.  
The interpretation of Blaga’s position on the question of God is a subject of dispute. The 
closest thing to the God of theism in Blaga’s philosophy is the “Great Anonymous,” also referred 
to as the “Anonymous Fund,” and on rare occasions as “God.”1 But Blaga is quick to explain that 
when he uses the term “God” to refer to the Great Anonymous, he is using it metaphorically, and 
that there are significant differences between his own conception and that of traditional 
theology.2 He further states that attributes are usually ascribed to God that he believes cannot be 
known to apply to the Great Anonymous.3 Ultimately, while he grants that the term “God” could 
be used as a synonym for the Great Anonymous, since God is the metaphysically central existent 
in Christian theology and the Great Anonymous is the metaphysically central existent in Blaga’s 
philosophy,4 he will not even affirm that the Great Anonymous is an existent in the usual sense, 
saying rather that conceiving it thus is merely a "crutch" used by the understanding.5 
                                                          
1
 These names and several others are used and explained in chapters two and ten of Blaga’s 
DiferenŃialele divine (Bucharest: FundaÛia pentru literaturǎ Õi artǎ “Regele Carol II,” 1940). The 
term “Great Anonymous” was used by Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, but Blaga states that 
his use of the term differs radically from how Dionysius used it, see Blaga, Artǎ si valoare, in 
Opere 10: Trilogia Valorilor, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1987), 630. 
2
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 104. Blaga warns that “it is not advisable to concede some 
preconceived opinions (of theologians),” Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 159; see also Blaga, 
Cenzura transcendentǎ, 542, where he states that he avoids using the term because of its 
accumulated baggage. Blaga, Cenzura transcendentǎ, in Opere 8: Trilogia CunoaÕterii, ed. Dorli 
Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1983). 
3
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 66. 
4
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 67. 
5
 Blaga, Cenzura transcendentǎ, 449. Some philosophical theologians assert that the same is true 
about God, since the human use of terminology to describe God is always inadequate to the task. 
See, for examples ancient and contemporary, Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite, The Complete 
Works, trans. Colm Lubheid (London: SPCK, 1987); especially the chapter “Mystical 
Theology”; John Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1990), 349ff; Jean-Luc Marion, Dieu Sans L’Etre (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2002). 
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In my previous article I argued that the Great Anonymous is sufficiently similar to the 
God of theism to support the conclusion that Blaga would at least tentatively affirm that God 
exists. I’ll not repeat those arguments here. Rather, in this article I intend to follow up the earlier 
by asking the question, if God exists, then what is he like? My answer will not take the form of a 
traditional theology, but rather an exploration of the theological implications of Blaga’s 
philosophy. In other words, if Blaga would say that God exists, what would he say God is like? 
 
The Challenge of a “Blaganian Theology” 
Admittedly, there are several significant challenges doing theology within the framework of 
Blaga’s philosophy. His reservation about traditional theology can hardly be ignored. He seems 
to feel that traditional theology is an accumulation of baggage that goes far beyond the limits of 
human epistemic ability.6 He explicitly rejects the central Christian doctrine of the incarnation, 
and expresses great reservation about the likelihood of divine revelation.7 And while many 
religious traditions, including Christianity, make room for a natural theology based upon what 
can be inferred about God from his creation, natural theology is generally considered to be 
capable of discovering only the basic truths of theology. The bulk of theological opinion is 
dependent upon divine self-revelation of some sort. So Blaga’s skepticism towards revelation is a 
significant hurdle. 
Blaga’s skepticism toward revelation stems from several fundamental aspects of his 
philosophical system. The first of these is his view of the transcendence of the Great 
Anonymous. He describes the Great Anonymous as so transcending empirical experience that 
even the idea itself is not a product of observation. The idea of the Great Anonymous is a sort of 
Neo-Kantian postulate, a product of human imagination that is plausible because of its immense 
heuristic value, but it is not empirically verifiable.8 The name “Anonymous” signifies this 
separation and hiddenness. 
In Blaga’s cosmology, the Great Anonymous creates everything else that exists through a 
process of emanation of minute particles called “differentials” that combine to make up the 
spiritual and physical world. Since the Great Anonymous is the source of all else, it differs 
ontologically from all else, just as the creator differs from the thing created.9 Blaga’s own view, 
                                                          
6
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 159, Cenzura transcendentǎ, 542. 
7
 Blaga, Gâdirea magicǎ şi religie, in Dorli Blaga, ed., Opere 10: Trilogia Valorilor (Bucharest: 
Editura Minerva, 1987) 479. 
8
 Blaga writes that the idea of the Great Anonymous “does not have the pretensions of theology, 
in the usual sense, nor as of a supreme result of some inductions. It represents merely an 
anticipation, which can demand the consent of the readers only progressively and to the degree in 
which it will be in a position to organize a metaphysical vision of great scope without arriving in 
conflict with the results of experience.” Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 67. 
9
 That there is discontinuity between the creator and the created has been remarked by a number 
of thinkers. According to some Gnostic and neo-Platonic thinkers, any product is inferior to its 
producer, therefore the world is necessarily dis-analogous to its source. According to Christian 
theology, there exists great discontinuity between God and creation because of the misuse of free 
will and the resulting fall of man, which affected all of creation. According to Plato, the 
discontinuity from Form to object is a result of the inability of material to receive the perfection 
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which he sees as a tentative hypothesis pragmatically justified by its success in explaining other 
problems,10 yet also as being a result of deductions from certain empirical observations,11 is that 
the product of the Great Anonymous’ creative activity is necessarily differentiated from the 
Great Anonymous itself in order to preserve the order of the cosmos. He calls this “differentiated 
creation.” One of the goals and benefits of differentiated creation is the generation of beings with 
cognitive capacity while at the same time censoring that capacity so as to protect both the beings 
and the order of the universe.12 Part of this censorship, discussed in detail in his book Cenzura 
transcendentǎ, involves preventing created beings from having positive knowledge of their 
creator so as to preclude the possibility of any rivalry on the part of the former. He calls this 
“transcendental censorship.” 
 Blaga states that the existence of dis-analogy between creator and creation is 
paradoxical.13 It is paradoxical because the expected result of a hidden creator as postulated by 
Blaga would be the production of other entities like itself, the production of identical self-
replications. Blaga finds it surprising but empirically evident that this self-replication has not 
taken place. The explanation for this surprising non-occurrence is the necessity of thwarting 
“theo-geneses” in order to preserve the necessary order of existence.14 Donning his poet’s cap, he 
describes the Great Anonymous as "the existence that holds us at the periphery, that refuses us, 
that imposes limits on us, but to which is owed every other existence."15 
 A third element of Blaga’s philosophy that is relevant to the possibility of doing theology 
is his theory of “stylistic braking.” “Stylistic brakes” are deep subconscious categories of the 
mind that shape and inform one’s attempts to understand and express those things that transcend 
ordinary experience. Blaga also calls them “abyssal categories.” They affect all theoretical 
knowledge such that it is always a cultural product.16 The abyssal categories function both 
positively and negatively in cognition, and these two functions are intrinsically related. They 
function as a structural medium for understanding the transcendent and as a limit to this 
understanding (which is the aspect properly termed "stylistic brakes"). Thus the abyssal 
categories both enable humans to create, and prevent human creativity and cognition from 
reaching absolute adequacy.17 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the Form. Blaga criticizes these proposals on the grounds that each gives to a second element, 
in addition to the Great Anonymous, a key role in the formation of the cosmos. He also objects to 
the latent potential for overcoming of the creator-creation discontinuity found in each of these 
proposals. Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 158. 
10
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 154. 
11
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 159. 
12
 This will be explained in the section on Transcendent Censorship. 
13
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 190. 
14
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 192. 
15
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 66. 
16Blaga, ÔtiinÛa Õi creaÛie, in Dorli Blaga, ed., Opere 10: Trilogia Valorilor (Bucharest: Editura 
Minerva, 1987) 199, 211. 
17Blaga, FiinÛa istoricǎ, in Opere 11: Trilogia Cosmologicǎ, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Editura 
Minerva, 1988) 492-4. 
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 Both the transcendence of the Great Anonymous and the protective/defensive measures 
that it employs against human cognition (transcendent censorship and stylistic braking) raise 
doubts about the likelihood of any divine revelation, and they also seem to rule out the 
possibility of natural theology. Together they provide an almost insurmountable obstacle to the 
traditional task of theology. But it is clear that Blaga feels entitled to at least some assertions 
about the nature of the Great Anonymous. How can this be, in light of the bleak epistemic 
picture resulting from this metaphysical vision? 
 An alternative source of theological knowledge is philosophical theology. Philosophical 
theology attempts to deduce or infer the attributes of God without resorting to revelation. The 
deductions or inferences of philosophical theology are usually based on an analysis of what 
attributes would be most consistent with other philosophical considerations, such as ethics or 
metaphysics.18 
 Blaga’s philosophy contains certain elements that strongly resemble the philosophical 
theology approach to discovering the attributes of God. In Blaga’s case, the attributes of the 
Great Anonymous are either inferred from other elements of his metaphysics or are postulated 
and then confirmed according to the epistemological methodology that he names “luciferic 
cognition.”19 The conclusions of this part of Blaga’s philosophy are sparse (in comparison with 
traditional theology) and are viewed by Blaga as tentative, in keeping with the limits of 
transcendent censorship. But they do describe what Blaga takes to be likely attributes of the 
Great Anonymous. So if the earlier argument that the Great Anonymous is Blaga’s version of 
“God” holds, then these attributes of the Great Anonymous are Blaga’s theology. 
 
The Divine Attributes 
Traditional theologians have put great effort into describing the attributes of God. A typical text 
on Christian theology includes explanation and defense of such doctrines as God’s personhood, 
aseity (self-existence), simplicity, immutability, trinity, holiness, lovingness, sovereignty, 
truthfulness, eternality, omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, and omnisapience.20 But 
because of Blaga’s reservations about divine revelation and natural theology, these conclusions 
of the theological approach to knowing the nature of God are not available to Blaganian 
theology. 
 Philosophers have also speculated about the nature of God. In general, philosophers have 
attempted to analyze the probable nature of God without resorting to divine revelation. 
                                                          
18
 These two approaches are utilized in many texts on the attributes of God. See Edward R. 
Wierenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989); Ed. L. Miller, ed., God and Reason: A Historical Approach to Philosophical 
Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1972), especially 21. 
19
 For an explanation of luciferic cognition, see Blaga’s book by the same title, and also Michael 
S. Jones, The Metaphysics of Religion: Lucian Blaga and Contemporary Philosophy (Madison, 
NJ, and Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 2006) 105-17. 
20
 See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II:1, 2 ed. G.W. Bromiley, T.F. Torrance (New York : T & 
T Clark, 2009); Augustus H. Strong, Systematic Theology: A Compendium (Valley Forge, PA: 
Judson Press, 1985), 249–352; Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1996), 19-99. 
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Philosophers have discussed and taken a variety of positions on divine attributes such as 
singularity, self-existence, infiniteness, personhood, lovingness, goodness, holiness, perfection, 
omnipotence, omniscience, timelessness, and sovereignty.21 
In contrast to traditional theologians and philosophers of religion, Blaga’s emphasis on 
the transcendence and resultant hiddenness of God leads him to a theoretical explanation of the 
human inability to know God’s nature.22 However, the human epistemic situation and divine 
inscrutability do not entail that no attributes of God can be postulated.23 After all, inscrutability is 
itself an attribute, of sorts. Although Blaga is hesitant to follow theologians and philosophers of 
religion down the path of rational speculation about the nature of God,24 his metaphysics does 
lead him to draw certain conclusions regarding the nature of the Great Anonymous. 
In order to fulfill its role in Blaga’s metaphysics, the Great Anonymous must necessarily 
be both the source of all other existents and the designer of the universe. This entails both aseity 
and creativity. The cleverness and intricacy of the plan employed by the Great Anonymous in 
creating and sustaining the universe seem to require that it be very wise and intelligent. 
Considerable power and some sort of sovereignty are also implied by this demonstration of 
creativity and providence. Corollaries of Blaga’s explanation of creation are the conclusions that 
the Great Anonymous both has the ability of self-replication and is not able to self-replicate 
without disturbing the balance of existence. That it refrains from this destabilizing self-
replication may be an indication that the Great Anonymous cares about the welfare of existence, 
thus indicating a degree of benevolence, and the Great Anonymous’ censorship of human 
cognition is a further indication of its benevolence toward creation. Blaga speculates that the 
Great Anonymous has a creative nature, and chooses to create in such a way as to efficiently 
produce the maximum creative effect with the minimum effort. These indicate divine efficiency. 
The endowing of humanity with a creative/cognitive drive but subject to transcendent censorship 
and stylistic braking is a strategy employed both for the benefit of humanity and for the 
furthering of divine creativity. This reveals that the plans of the Great Anonymous take into 
account equally its own desires and the well-being of other creatures. This could indicate (as 
                                                          
21
 On omniscience, see, for instance, Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 5–14; Peterson et al., eds., 
Reason and Religious Belief, 48–67; Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1977), 97–298; on timelessness, see Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1970); William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s 
Relationship to Time (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001); on sovereignty, see Paul Helm, The 
Providence of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994); Clark Pinnock et al., The 
Openness of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994). 
22
 In this Blaga is not unlike Dionysius and some others within monotheistic religions who have 
emphasized that the greatness of God so far exceeds human cognitive ability that God’s nature 
cannot be comprehended. 
23A similar argument regarding ineffability and limited theoretical postulation is found in Keith 
Ward, Religion and Revelation: A Theology of Revelation in the World's Religion (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 210–20, where Ward argues that 
God’s ineffability is not like the ineffability of Kantian noumena, which cannot be apprehended 
at all. 
24
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 67. 
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Blaga himself observes) that the nature of the Great Anonymous includes elements that are both 
divine and demonic in comparison to the traditional understanding of the nature of God.25 This 
could support the interpretation that the concerns of the Great Anonymous are holistic rather than 
theocentric. 
 Some religious practitioners make a distinction between “knowing things about God” and 
“knowing God.” According to some, the latter may be possible even if the former is not. That is, 
although God may transcend human comprehension, having a relationship with God may be 
possible. This is because relationships, while possibly involving cognitive states, may be distinct 
from them and may precede them.26 Blaga’s insistence that human knowledge of the Great 
Anonymous is censored does not eliminate the possibility of humans having a relationship with 
the Great Anonymous. In his discussions of mystical experiences Blaga concludes that mystical 
experiences do not lead to a cognition of transcendent reality that is free of the influence of the 
culture of the cognizing subject. He does not, however, deny that mystical experiences exist, and 
though one might think that one detects some reservation on Blaga’s part concerning the 
genuineness of such experiences, he never concludes that they are counterfeit. Therefore there 
may be room in Blaga’s philosophy for “knowing God” even where there is very little room for 
knowing “about God.” Hence it is possible that Blaga’s God is also relational. 
 
Conclusion 
There exists an undeniable tension within any philosophy or religion that posits the existence of 
a transcendent being and then proceeds to elaborate the attributes of that being.27 Blaga’s 
emphasis on the transcendence of the Great Anonymous heightens this tension. He attenuates the 
tension, however, by making the entire Great Anonymous hypothesis, including both the 
existence and the attributes of the Great Anonymous, a tentative philosophical postulate rather 
than a dogmatic doctrine. In Blaga’s philosophy, the existence of the Great Anonymous cannot 
be conclusively known, but it can be postulated, and this postulate can be pragmatically 
confirmed. 
Similarly, the attributes of the Great Anonymous cannot be conclusively known, but can 
be postulated and pragmatically confirmed. While it is indisputable that Blaga eschews 
traditional theology, and quite possible that he would be skeptical of any attempt to list the 
                                                          
25
 What Blaga has in mind here does not seem to be a good/evil dualism like that of 
Manichaeism nor a determinism that views God as the efficient cause of every event whether 
good or evil, but rather the recognition that the Great Anonymous often works in ways that seem 
evil to humans even though they are justified as part of a greater plan for creation. For example, 
the frustrating of the human aspiration to penetrate mystery and to grasp the transcendent is 
experienced by humans as an evil, but is intended by the Great Anonymous as a good, since it 
spurs human creativity, gives humanity a raison d’être, and perpetuates the creative activity of 
the Great Anonymous itself. 
26
 This distinction can be found in Eastern Orthodoxy, where the strong emphasis on the 
transcendence of God is not thought to prevent knowing (having a relationship to) God. It is also 
commonly made in Protestant Evangelicalism, wherein the strong emphasis on the importance of 
a personal relationship to God is not thought to negate the fact of God’s transcendence. 
27
 Blaga himself mentions this tension on page 67 of DiferenŃialele divine. 
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attributes of the Great Anonymous, he does discuss some attributes of the Great Anonymous that 
are direct implications of his speculative philosophy. Having opened the door to this method of 
theologizing, he can hardly object if others bring out further theological implications of his 
system. The following is the list of divine attributes that I see as entailed or implied but Blaga’s 
philosophy: 
 
Greatness 
Transcendence 
Anonymity 
Inscrutability  
Powerfulness 
Aseity 
Creativeness 
Efficiency 
Intelligence 
Wisdom 
Sovereignty 
Benevolence/beneficence 
Holistic 
Possibly Relational 
 
Perhaps further reflection on Blaga’s philosophical system will bring to light additional 
theological implications. For now, I think it sufficient to conclude that Blaga allowed for, 
perhaps even implied, the existence of a supreme God, that he provided a philosophical method 
for drawing some tentative conclusions about the nature of that God, and that through his 
philosophy he suggested this list of divine attributes. 
 
 
Michael S. Jones 
Liberty University, March 2010 
 
